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ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION RELATED TO
MARITIME AVIATION ACCIDENTS
CAROLYN DAIGLE WIGGINS
T HE POWER OF FEDERAL COURTS to administer mar-
itime law is derived from the Constitution. Article III, sec-
tion two declares that "[t]he judicial Power shall extend to
: * * all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction."' Rely-
ing upon this Constitutional grant, Congress, in the Judiciary
Act of 1789,1 provided: "[T]he district courts. . . shall also
have exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admi-
ralty and maritime jurisdicition . . . ." The governing lan-
guage of the constitutional provision and the congressional
grant have guided the courts in determining which issues
should properly be heard in federal courts. This comment will
trace the development of judicial standards governing juris-
diction of admiralty courts and the application of those stan-
dards to the aviation industry.
DEVELOPMENT OF ADMIRALTY LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES
Admiralty law is a body of rules, concepts and practices
that regulate transportation on water.' The maritime industry
of Europe was sufficiently developed by 1400 to reguire sepa-
U.S. CONST. art. III § 2, cl. 1.
Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1)
(1966)).
3 See generally G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY, ch. 1 (2d ed.
1975). This body of rules, concepts and practices is very attractive to plaintiffs. See
infra notes 205-08 and accompanying text.
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rate courts to adjudicate all maritime commercial issues."
Bodies of law were soon codified to govern the various seaport
industries.5 England established maritime courts. Later Amer-
ican colonists introduced admiralty courts into the American
colonial legal system.6 After the American Revolution, the
Framers of the Constitution established admiralty courts, and
Congress granted admiralty jurisdiction to the federal courts.
The task of defining the scope and limitations of admiralty
jurisdiction ensued.7
In the early case of DeLovio v. Boit,5 Mr. Justice Story sug-
gested a liberal Constitutional interpretation of United States
admiralty laws in order to be in harmony with the maritime
law, of European and the Mediterranean nations.' Justice
Story stated that, under the Constitution, federal admiralty
jurisdicton "comprehends all maritime contracts, torts, and
injuries. The latter branch (torts and injuries) is necessarily
bounded by locality; the former [contracts] extends over all
contracts (wheresoever they may be made or executed. .. )
which relate to the navigation business or commerce of the
sea." 10 Thus, Justice Story sets out his own assessment of the
necessity for "maritime" locality as a prerequisite for admi-
ralty jurisdiction for maritime torts."
The Supreme Court embraced the "locality alone" standard
4Id.
&Id.
* See generally I E. BENEDICT, BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY, ch. 6 at 1-18 (7th ed.
1981).
Id. at 19-43.
7 F. Cas. 418 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 3,776) (action upon an insurance policy,
party alleging it to be maritime contract).
I Id. at 443.
10 Id. at 444 (emphasis added). Note that this comprehends a "nature of the pur-
pose" test for contracts, as compared to a "locality" test for torts.
" Justice Story first expressed this "locality" test in Thomas v. Lane, 23 F. Cas
957 (C.C.D. Me. 1813) (No. 13, 902) when he stated:
In regard to torts, I have always understood, that the jurisduction of
the admiralty has not, and never (I believe) deliberately claimed to
have any jurisdiction over torts, except such as are maritime torts, that
is, such as are committed on the high seas, or on waters within the ebb
and flow of the tide.
Id. at 960.
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for cases involving torts in The Plymouth 2 where a steamship
caught fire and ignited warehouses on an adjoining wharf.'3
Because the entire damage occurred on land, the Court held
that admiralty jurisdiction was not cognizable:
The jurisdiction of the admiralty does not depend upon the
fact that the injury was inflicted by the vessel, but upon the
locality-the high seas, or navigable waters where it occurred.
Every species of tort, however occurring, and whether on board
a vessel or not, if upon the high seas or navigable waters, is of
admiralty cognizance.'
4
The Supreme Court's early pronouncement that the scope
of admiralty jurisdicition governing maritime torts was to be
determined solely by locality has extended to modern time.'
The "locality test", however, has been criticized.'" Critics as-
sert that the nation's concern for the business of navigation
and shipping, and the need for uniformity in the control and
regulation of shipping as an industry, were the original pur-
poses for creating a separate jurisdiction." Coupling these
," 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20 (1865).
I /d.
" Id. at 36. The Plymouth has in effect been overruled by the Extension of Admi-
ralty Jurisdiction Act, ch. 526, 62 Stat. 496 (1948)(current version at 46 U.S.C. § 740
(1970)), to the extent that its holding denied a remedy in admiralty for damage done
to land structures by vessels on navigable waters. That Act provides: "The admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction of the United States shall extend to and include all cases of
damage or injury, to person or property, caused by a vessel on navigable water, not-
withstanding that such damage or injury be done or consummated on land." 46
U.S.C. § 740 (1970).
'5 See Victory Carries, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202 (1971)(refusing to extend admi-
ralty jurisdiction to a claim for relief brought by a longshoreman injured on the dock
by the stevedore's equipment). For an extensive list of citations restating this princi-
ple see id. at 205 n.2. Authorities either acknowledging the proper test of admiralty
tort jurisdiction as an open question or expressly favoring a maritime nexus require-
ment in addition to a maritime locality are listed in Note, Federal
Courts-Admiralty Jurisdiction-"Maritime Locality Plus Maritime Nexus" Re-
quired to Establish Admiralty Jurisdiction in Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 14
B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 1071 (1973).
" See Black, Admiralty Jurisdiction: Critique and Suggestions, 50 COLUM. L. REv.
259 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Black]. See generally, G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE
LAW OF ADMIRALTY, (2d ed. 1975); A. Pelaez, Admiralty Tort Jurisdiction-The Last
Barrier, 7 DUQ. L. REv. 1, 42 (1968); 7A J. MOORE, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1
.325[3][5] (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as J. MOORE].
7 See Black, supra note 16, at 261.
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original purposes with the sole Constitutional requirement of
an admiralty or maritime nexus, the critics point to the lack
of need or reason for entertaining in federal courts suits con-
cerning swimmers or pleasure boat captains."8 The strict "lo-
cality test" has resulted in the admission to federal courts and
the application of substantive admiralty law to cases on the
basis of clearly fortuitous circumstances.19 The test also would
have resulted in the exclusion of other cases which, based
upon the nature of their subject matter, should have been
maintained in admiralty.20 One of the foremost critics of the
locality test, Judge Benedict, expressed what has come to be
known as his "celebrated doubt" 2' as to the validity of a
mechanical application of the "strict locality" standard.22
" See generally Birdwell & Whitten, Admiralty Jurisdiction, The Outlook for the
Doctrine of Executive Jet, 1974 DuKE L.J. 757; Black, supra note 16; Note, Admi-
ralty Jurisdiction; Excutive Jet in Historical Perspective, 34 OHIO ST. L.J. 355
(1973). Professor Moore states: "Distance from navigable waters is, clearly, not the
test. We are solely concerned with whether the essential nature of the occurrence is
maritime and if it compels the application of the uniform substantive law and far-
reaching procedures and remedies that are an inherent part of the admiralty." 7A J.
MOORE, supra note 16, at 3584.
19 See In re Motor Ship Pac. Carrier, 489 F.2d 152 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S.
931 (1974) (holding that an action to recover for damages to a vessel caused in a
bridge collision brought against the owner of a store-based paper mill which ob-
structed navigation by emitting large quantities of smoke was within the jurisdiction
of admiralty); St. Hillaire Moye v. Henderson, 496 F.2d 973 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 884 (1974) (holding that an action by a water skier against the operator of a
pleasure craft was within the jurisdiction of admiralty); Oppen v. Aetna Ins. Co., 485
F.2d 252 (9th Cir. 1973) (holding that an action by private pleasure boat owners for
compensation for damages to their pleasure boats caused by oil spill was within the
jurisdiction of admiralty).
20 See 7A J. MOORE, supra note 16, 1 .325[4]. These instances have resulted in both
congressional and judicial attempts to reform this area to achieve more equitable re-
sults when the cause of action would not meet the locality test. See as an example,
McKie v. Diamond Marine Co., 204 F.2d 132 (5th Cir. 1953), infra note 53, where the
court noted that recovery under the Jones Act or doctrine of maintenance and cure is
not related to the place of injury, but on the relationship of the party to a vessel. See
infra notes 51-58.
,1 See infra note 22. The doubt expressed by Judge Benedict as to the propriety of
granting admiralty jurisdiction to situations exclusively on the basis of their occur-
rence on water is generally cited in literature related to criticism of the strict locality
test. It has been retained in all seven editions of Benedict's multi-volume treatise on
Admiralty and has come to be known as the "celebrated doubt."
2 E. BENEDICT, THE LAW OF AMERICAN ADMIRALTY (1850). Judge Benedict first
questioned whether marine locality was enough or whether some relationship of the
parties to the ship may also be necessary. The judge stated:
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The first judicial expression of Judge Benedict's "celebrated
doubt" appeared in Campbell v. H. Hackfeld & Co.2" in which
the Ninth Circuit challenged the mechanical application of a
"strict locality" test.24 In Campbell, the court denied admi-
ralty jurisdiction to a stevedore injured while unloading a ship
anchored in navigable waters.2 5 The court criticized the hold-
ing of The Plymouth,26 and, citing Judge Benedict, stated:
"The fundamental principles underlying all cases of tort, as
well as contract, is that, to bring a case within the jurisdiction
of a court of admiralty, maritime relations of some sort must
exist, for the all-sufficient reason that the admiralty does not
concern itself with non-maritime affairs.
2 7
Other courts have steadfastly applied the strict locality
test.2 8 The Supreme Court, when given an opportunity to rule
on the question of the propriety of the "locality alone" stan-
dard, found it unnecessary to resolve the issue.2 In Atlantic
Transport Co. v. Imbrovek,30 a stevedore was injured while
loading copper on board a vessel. The defendant argued that
no maritime relationship was present, and therefore no admi-
It may, however, be doubted whether the civil jurisdiction, in cases of
torts, does not depend upon the relation of the parties to a ship or
vessel, embracing only those tortious violations of maritime right and
duty which occur in vessels to which the Admiralty jurisdiction, in
cases of contracts, applies. If one of several landsmen bathing in the
sea, should assault, or imprison, or rob another, it has not been held
here that the Admiralty would have jurisdiction of the action for the
tort.
Id. at 173.
-3 125 F. 696 (9th Cir. 1903).
4 Id. at 700.
16 Id. at 701. A stevedore is a person employed in loading and unloading vessels.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1585 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
:6 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20 (1865). See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
7 125 F. at 697 (holding that a stevedore's employment is not maritime in nature
and therefore, not subject to admiralty). With modern judicial interpretation, the
precise holding of Campbell, like the holding in The Plymouth, has been overturned
by a later action. See supra note 14. In Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imborvek, 234 U.S.
52 (1914), the Supreme Court held that a stevedore's employment is maritime and
thus proper for admiralty jurisdiction. See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
' See 7A J. MOORE, supra note 16, at .325[2].
19 Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U.S. 52 (1914).
0 Id.
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ralty jurisdiction existed. The Court disagreed, 1 stating:
Even if it be assumed that the requirement as to locality in
tort cases, while indispensable, is not necessarily exclusive, still
in the present case the wrong which was the subject of the suit
was, we think, of a maritime nature and hence the district
court, from any point of view, had jurisdiction. . . .If more is
required than the locality of the wrong in order to give the
court jurisdiction, the relation of the wrong to maritime ser-
vice, to navigation and to commerce on navigable waters, was
quite sufficient.32
Drawing strength from the Supreme Court's refusal to ex-
pressly reaffirm The Plymouth,"3 some courts began to formu-
late what they perceived to be more appropriate standards.
They added the requirement of a maritime activity to the "lo-
cality test. ' 34 In McGuire v. City of New York, 35 the Southern
District of New York dismissed the libel s' of an injured swim-
mer as not within admiralty jurisdicition. McGuire, while
swimming at a public beach, sustained hand injuries when he
:1 Id. at 63.
1 Id. at 61-62.
33 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
" See Peytavin v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 453 F.2d 1121, 1127 (5th Cir.
1972) (noting that the outer edge of admiralty tort jurisdiction has not been charted
with precision and holding that plaintiff's claim for damages for whiplash injuries
allegedly sustained in a rear-end automobile collision, which occurred on a floating
pontoon at a ferry landing while the plaintiff was waiting to board a ferry, was not
properly within the jurisdicition of admiralty because of the lack of substantial con-
nection with maritime activities or interest); Gowdy v. United States, 412 F.2d 525,
528-29 (6th Cir. 1969) (relying on the Chapman analysis, see infra note 39, and hold-
ing that plaintiff's claim for damages resulting from a fall to the ground from a light-
house located at the end of a breakwater extending into Lake Michigan was not prop-
erly within admiralty jurisdiction because it lacked substantial connection with
maritime activities); Smith v. Guerrant, 290 F. Supp. 111, 113-114 (S.D. Tex. 1968)
(arguing for the uniform adoption of a test entirely dependent on a maritime connec-
tion and holding there was not jurisdiction in admiralty where a forklift ran off a
wharf in a yacht basin and came to rest on a finger pier, and defendant's crane was
engaged to lift the forklight and place it back on the dock, and, while engaged in
doing so, the crane's boom collapsed dropping the forklift into the waters of the
harbor).
" 192 F. Supp. 866 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
In admiralty, a libel is the equivalent of a complaint. It is the initiatory pleading
on the part of the plaintiff or complainant in an admiralty or ecclesiastical cause,
corresponding to the declaration, bill, or complaint. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1060
(4th ed. 1968).
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came in contact with a submerged object."' Noting that the
broadly stated principle of The Plymouth has not survived
and that libel did not relate to any tort growing out of naviga-
tion, the court stated that'the proper scope of admiralty juris-
diction should include all matters relating to "the business of
the sea and the business conducted on navigable waters." 8
Shortly thereafter, in Chapman v. City of Grosse Point
Farms,39 the Sixth Circuit applied similar logic to another
swimming situtation. In denying admiralty jurisdiction, the
court stated, "it is here determined that jurisdiction may not
be based solely on the locality criterion. A relationship must
exist between the wrong and some maritime service, naviga-
tion or commerce on navigable waters."' 0
Both of these courts applied a standard requiring more than
locality. McGuire, however, held that the maritime relation-
ship was a threshold consideration; the want of a sufficient
maritime relationship made a secondary finding of "locality"
unnecessary."1 In Chapman, the court made a true "locality
plus" analysis, initially making a separate finding as to "local-
ity," before making an inquiry as to "maritime relationship."'"
In the analysis of the Chapman case both elements were
deemed necessary for the court to grant admiralty jurisdiction
with no indication of the priority of one over the other. 3
Still later, in Peytavin v. Government Employees Insur-
ance Co." the Fifth Circuit denied admiralty jurisdiction for a
37 192 F. Supp. at 866.
Id. at 871-72.
39 385 F.2d 962 (6th Cir. 1967) (holding that a swimmer injured when he dove off a
pier into eighteen inches of water could not invoke admiralty jurisdiction in suit
against the city for alleged negligence in failing to erect barriers to prevent diving and
failing to warn of the shallow water).
40 Id. at 966. The court noted that following Atlantic Transport it could be said
that some relationship between the alleged wrong and maritime service, navigation or
commerce on navigable waters is a condition sub silentio to admiralty jurisdiction.
" McGuire v. City of N.Y., 192 F. Supp. 866, 871(1961). Note that this would re-
sult in a single test to be applied to torts or contracts and is the position urged by
Benedict, see supra notes 21-22. See supra note 35.
1 Chapman v. City of Grosse Point Farms, 385 F.2d 962, 965 (1967). See supra
note 39.
" Id. at 966. Note that this position relies on the question left unanswered in At-
lantic, see supra note 39.
. 453 F.2d 1121 (5th Cir. 1972). See supra note 34.
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case involving whiplash injuries that occurred on a ferryboat
landing."5 The court reasoned that federal court admiralty ju-
risdiction was based upon the need for uniform law governing
maritime industries. Thus, if there Wvere no maritime activity
or interest, maritime jurisdiction would not be sustained. 6
Courts continued to struggle with the rule in The Plym-
outh4 7 and made painstaking efforts to justify the application
of admiralty law to the fact situation. 6 In addition, the Su-
preme Court passed up another opportunity to reassess its po-
sition in Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law4 9 by denying admiralty
jurisdiction to a stevedore injured on a dock, stating: "The
historical view of this Court has been that the maritime tort
jurisdiction of the federal courts is determined by the locality
of the accident and that maritime law governs only those torts
occurring on navigable water of the United States." 0 Thus,
the Court left the rule in The Plymouth firmly intact.
Congressional and judicial reaction to the application of the
strict locality test resulted in a number of statutes and con-
cepts allowing admiralty jurisdiction when there was clearly a
traditional maritime relationship but when the locality of the
tort was not exclusively in navigable water. An illustration of
this pragmatic judicial utilization of admiralty concepts was
the granting of "maintenance and cure" to seamen regardless
of whether their illness or injury first manifested itself or oc-
curred upon land rather than upon navigable waters.5 1 The
,5 Id. at 1122.
41 Id. at 1127.
4' The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20 (1866). See supra note 12 and accompanying
text.
"6 See, e.g., Davis v. City of Jacksonville Beach, Fla., 251 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Fla.
1965) (holding that injury to a swimmer caused by a surfboard was within admiralty
jurisdiction based upon the conjecture that a surfboard posed a potential threat to
maritime trade or commerce).
" 404 U.S. 202 (1971). See supra note 15.
Id. at 205.
* See O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36 (1943). Benefit-
ting from the doctrine of maintenance and cure, a seaman can often obtain needed
board, lodging and medical care while his action for pain, suffering and lost wages is
pending against his employer. In no other area of the law is this true. Railroad work-
eis may sue their employers but they may not receive interim compensation. Employ-
ees within the scope of a state worker's compensation statute or the Longshoremen
and Harbor Workers Compensation Act are furnished with a compensation award but
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concept of "maintenance and cure" evolved from historical
admiralty law, and benefits a seaman injured or stricken with
illness at a time during a period of maritime employment. The
Jones Act,52 enacted by Congress, was interpreted by the
courts as extending to seaman or their personal representa-
tives a tort cause of action enforceable, in admiralty, at the
plaintiff's election regardless of the place of the injury.53
The concept of "seaworthiness" is another ancient admi-
ralty doctrine by which a seaman could recover damages from
the vessel owner for personal injuries sustained as a result of
the unseaworthiness of a vessel. This cause of action has been
made available to a longshoreman injured on shore from the
alleged "unseaworthiness" of a vessel's gear.14 The doctrine
has since been extended to include damages caused by the
cargo as well as the vessel and its appurtenances.55
The Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Acte was enacted
to prevent inequities such as those manifest in The Plym-
outh. The Act provides admiralty jurisdiction for all cases of
damage or injury caused by a vessel on water not with-
standing that the damage be done on land. In 1972, Congress
amended the Longshoremens and Harbor Workers Compensa-
tion Act" and broadened its scope to include injuries incurred
are normally precluded from suing their employers. Only the seaman has both reme-
dies available. See generally 7A J. MooRE, note 16 supra, at 1] ,325[4].
:, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970).
3 See McKie v. Diamond Marine Co., 204 F.2d 132 (5th Cir. 1953). The court
stated:
The right of recovery under the Jones Act, as in the case of mainte-
nance and cure, depends not on the place where the injury is inflicted,
this being wholly immaterial, but on the nature of the service and its
relationship to the operation of the vessel plying in navigable waters.
Id. at 134.
" See Strike v. Netherland Ministry of Traffic, 185 F.2d 555, 558 (1950). See also
Dixon v. The Cyrus, F. Cas. 755 (D. Pa. 1789) (No. 3930). In Dixon the court held
that the unseaworthiness of a vessel gives a seaman the privilege of leaving the vessel
without incurring penalties for desertion and without forfeiting wages. Id. at 757.
b See Gutierrez v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 373 U.S. 206 (1963) (longshoreman
employed to unload a ship entitled to admiralty law for his injuries sustained when
he slipped on loose beans which leaked from defective bags, a part of the cargo).
" 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1970). See supra note 14.
" See 7A J. MOORE supra note 16 at 1 .325[4].
- 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1976). The strict situs oriented test was modified by the
1972 amendments to the Act which broadened the definition of "navigable waters of
19821
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on land related to maritime activity.
AVIATION AND ADMIRALTY
In the early era of aviation, suits involving crashes above
the high seas were heard in admiralty courts with their juris-
diction based upon the locality test.59 As more and more
states enacted wrongful death statutes, and interpreted them
broadly enough to apply to occurrences within the states' ter-
ritorial waters, Congress sought to provide a comparable rem-
edy to the representatives of persons dying on the high seas as
a result of the wrongful acts of others.60 In 1920, Congress en-
acted the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA) 61 which
provides:
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful
act, neglect, or default occurring on the high seas beyond a
marine league from the shore of any State, or the District of
Columbia, or the Territories or dependencies of the United
States, the personal representative of the decedent may main-
tain a suit for damages in the district courts of the United
States, in admiralty."2
The Death on the High Seas Act was interpreted by the
courts to apply to aviation accidents occurring beyond state
territorial waters.63 The rationale was based on two considera-
the United States" to include "any, adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal, building
way, marine railway, or other adjoining area customarily used by an employer in load-
ing, unloading, repairing, or building a vessel." Id. at § 903(a).
" See The Crawford Bros. No. 2, 215 F. 269 (W.D. Wash. 1914). Early aviation
cases indicate that the federal courts had trouble characterizing the new flying ma-
chines as instruments cognizable in admiralty. In Crawford, the court held that the
action lacked admiralty standards because airplanes "are neither of the land nor sea,
and not being of the sea or restricted in their activities to navigable waters, they are
not maritime." Id. at 271. But compare Reinhardt v. Newport Flying Serv. Corp., 232
N.Y. 115, 133 N.E. 371 (1921), where the court granted admiralty jurisdiction in a
case involving a seaplane accident. The court tentatively held: "We think the craft,
though new, is subject, while afloat, to the tribunals of the sea." 133 N.E. at 372
(emphasis added).
60 See generally H. BAR, ADMIRALTY LAW OF THE SUPREME COURT, ch. 1 (2d ed.
1969); 7A J. MOORE, supra note 16, at .330[2].
' 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-68 (1976).
Id. at § 761.
' See 7A J. MOORR, supra note 16, at .330[2].
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tions; first, the locality test, 4 and second, the statutory inter-
pretation of the law. 5 Admiralty jurisdiction for wrongful
deaths arising from crashes of land-based aircraft occurring
over the high seas beyond one marine league from shore is
now firmly established. 66
For an aircraft accident occurring within the territorial wa-
ters of a state DOHSA is not expressly applicable. However,
in Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 7 a plane crashed into
Boston Harbor shortly after takeoff, clearly within the territo-
rial waters of the state. The Third Circuit granted admiralty
jurisdiction to the tort claims resulting from the crash, reason-
ing that if a tort claim arising from an aircraft accident be-
yond one league from shore is within the maritime jurisdiction
of the court, then a tort claim arising from a crash within one
league from shore must be within the maritime jurisdiction as
well.6 While the court cited Atlantic Transport Co. v. Im-
brovek69 as having rejected the requirement that the tort must
have some connection with a vessel, it nonetheless noted that
"locality plus" was also present by way of a proper maritime
connection.7 0
EXECUTIVE JET: A NEW STANDARD IS
ANNOUNCED
The preceding cases illustrate the judicial treatment given
aviation accidents in the lower federal courts at the time the
64 Wilson v. Transocean Airlines, 121 F. Supp. 85 (N.D. Cal. 1954) (holding that
admiralty jurisdiction is dependent upon the locality where the tort occurred). Choy
v. Pan American Airways Company, 1941 AMC 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) (the crash of a
land-based airplane into navigable waters gives rise to a cause of action enforceable
with the admiralty jurisdiction).
so D'Aleman v. Pan-American World Airways, 259 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1958). Inter-
preting the statute, the court held that "on the high seas" could be capable of exten-
sion to apply to "under" and "over" the high seas. Id. at 495.
" See 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1976); 7A J. MOORE, supra note 16, 1 .330[2].
67 316 F.2d 758 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 940 (1963).
" Id. at 763. The court analogized this set of facts to the DOHSA reasoning.
:9 234 U.S. 52 (1914). See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
0 316 F.2d 758 (3d Cir. 1963). By way of a proper maritime connection, the court
stated: "[w]hen an aircraft crashes into navigable waters, the dangers to persons and
property are much the same as those arising out of the sinking of a ship or a collision
between two vessels." Id. at 763.
1982]
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Supreme Court granted certiorari of Executive Jet Aviation
Inc. v. City of Cleveland7' in the fall of 1972. Some courts
steadfastly applied The Plymouth7 2 strict locality rule as the
standard of admiralty jurisdiction for all torts. Other courts
accepted the McGuire v. City of New York7 3 analysis and held
that "locality" was a limitation of the determinative factor of
maritime nexus; without a maritime nexus, a finding on local-
ity was unnecessary. Still other courts adopted the Chapman
v. City of Grosse Point Farms7 4 analysis which required a
finding of both locality and maritime nexus before granting
jurisdiction. Finally, courts often applied their own ad hoc
standards.
In Executive Jet,75 a case remarkably like Weinstein,7 6 an
airplane ingested seagulls into its engines while attempting
takeoff. The plane had been cleared for takeoff, but lost power
before becoming totally airborne, hit an airport perimeter
fence and a parked truck and came to rest in Lake Erie, one
fifth of a mile from shore.77 The aircraft owners asserted ad-
miralty jurisdiction to sue the air traffic controller, the City of
Cleveland as owner and operator of the airport and the air-
port manager.78
The judicial treatment of Executive Jet is illustrative of the
variety of analysis historically applied to maritime torts. The
district court followed a Chapman7 9 analysis and denied ad-
miralty jurisdiction, finding that the situs of the tort was on
land and that the wrong bore no relationship to maritime
matters.8 " The separate findings on both issues, "locality" and
71 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
72 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20 (1866). See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
73 192 F. Supp. 866 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
14 385 F.2d 962 (6th Cir. 1967). See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
75 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
76 Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 316 F.2d 758 (3d Cir. 1963). See supra note
67 and accompanying text.
7 409 U.S. at 251.
78 Id.
79 385 F.2d 962 (6th Cir. 1967). See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
" 409 U.S. at 251. The Supreme Court, quoting the district court, went on to say,
"Assuming... that air commerce bears some relationship to maritime commerce
when the former is carried out over navigable waters, the relevant circumstances here
were unconnected with the maritime facets of commerce." Id.
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"maritime relation" indicate that the court applied a two-
pronged standard. On appeal, however, the Sixth Circuit ig-
nored "maritime relation" and affirmed the denial of jurisdic-
tion based on the lack of "locality." '
Noting the seemingly important question affecting jurisdic-
tion, the Supreme Court began its analysis of Executive Jet
by tracing the development of "locality" as the sole require-
ment for admiralty jurisdiction.s2 The Court noted that the
test was established and developed "in an era when it was dif-
ficult to conceive of a tortious act on navigable waters other
than in connection with a waterborne vessel."83 The Court
noted that the test had served well the needs of commerce
when applied to "traditional types of maritime torts. '8 4
After quoting the extensive list of critics of "locality" the
Court stated that it never had held explicitly that a maritime
locality was the sole test.88 Following its historical discourse,
the Court announced that locality alone would not be a suffi-
cient basis for admiralty jurisdiction in aviation tort acci-
dents.8 The Court stated that:
It is far more consistent with the history and purpose of admi-
ralty to require also that the wrong bear a significant relation-
ship to traditional maritime activity. We hold that unless such
a relationship exists, claims arising from airplane accidents are
not cognizable in admiralty in the absence of legislation to the
81 Id. at 252. The Supreme Court noted that the appeals court found it unneces-
sary to consider the question of maritime relationship or nexus which the Sixth Cir-
cuit had discussed earlier in Chapman Id..
81 Id. at 253-54.
I3 d. at 254.
Id. The Court, quoting a leading admiralty text, stated:
It should be stressed that the important cases in admiralty are not the
borderline cases on jurisdiction; these may exercise a perverse fascina-
tion in the occasion they afford for elaborate casuistry, but the main
business of the [admiralty] court involves claims for cargo damage, col-
lision, seamen's injuries and the like-all well and comfortably within
the circle, and far from the penumbra.
G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 24 n. 88 (1957).
s 409 U.S. at 258. See supra notes 29-32.
I d. at 261. "[W]e conclude that the mere fact that the alleged wrong 'occurs' or
'is located' on or over navigable waters-whatever that means in an aviation con-
text-is not of itself sufficient to turn an airplane negligence case into a 'maritime
tort'." Id. at 268.
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contrary.87
The Court, however, failed to spell out exactly what would
constitute a traditional maritime activity. An example of a sit-
uation clearly lacking the appropriate maritime relationship
was stated, that of an event befalling a land based plane flying
from one point in the continental United States to another. "
Thus, the Court made it possible to deduce from its analysis
the factors that the Court considered relevant. The Court
cited the degree of similarity between problems posed for the
downed planes and the problems posed for sinking ships, the
qualities and traditions of planes and ships, the traditional
and appropriate remedies available to the participants, and
the probable cause of the injuries sustained. 9 These appar-
ently are the factors the lower court should consider in deter-
mining whether a maritime relationship exists.
The Court expressly refused to exclude aircraft from admi-
ralty jurisdiction.' 0 Noting that there was no need to decide
whether an aviation tort could, under any circumstances, bear
a sufficient relationship to traditional maritime activity to
come within admiralty jurisdiction in the absence of legisla-
tion, the court hypothesized a possible scenario:
It could be argued, for instance, that if a plane flying from New
York to London crashed in the mid-Atlantic, there would be
admiralty jurisdiction over resulting tort claims even absent a
specific statute. An aircraft in that situation might be thought
to bear a significant relationship to traditional maritime activ-
ity because it would be performing a function traditionally per-
formed by waterborne vessels.'
87 Id.
" Id. at 271.
Id. at 264-72.
90 Id. at 271.
9, Id. With regard to such a situation, the court stated:
Were the maritime law not applicable, it is argued that the recovery
would depend upon a confusing consideration of what substantive law
to apply, i.e., the law of the forum, the law of the place where each
decedent purchased his ticket, the law of the place where the plane
took off, or perhaps the law of the point of destination.
Id. at 272 n.23 (quoting 7A J. Mooin, FEDERAL PRACTICE V.330[5), (2d. ed. 1972)).
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The Court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint after find-
ing that there was no maritime nexus in the case.2
THE LOWER COURTS INTERPRET EXECUTIVE JET
Following the Executive Jet decision, a flurry of commenta-
tors analyzed its impact on the law of admiralty jurisdiction.9
The general consensus was that locality, as a sole factor, was
no longer the standard in aviation torts; however, there was
little agreement on precisely what the new standard was.
Some writers perceived Executive Jet as requiring a "locality
plus" standard, 4 while other authors focused on the phrase
"significant relationship to traditional maritime activity" and
attempted to phrase new standards.' 5
11 Id. at 274. The Court noted that it perceived a need for aviation tort cases to be
governed by uniform substantive and procedural laws, and to be heard in federal
courts to assure uniformity, but observed that it was not for the Court to assume this
task. The Court added: "If federal uniformity is the desired goal with respect to
claims arising from aviation accidents, Congress is free under the Commerce Clause
to enact legislation applicable to all such accidents, whether occurring on land or
water, and adapted to the specific characteristics of air commerce." Id.
'3 See Birdwell & Whitten, Admiralty Jurisdiction: The Outlook for the Doctrine
of Executive Jet, 1974 DUKE L.J. 757; Mosley, Did That Airplane Affect Admiralty;
Executive Jet and its Aftermath, 25 FED. INS. COUN. Q. 319 (1975); Note, Federal
Courts-Admiralty Jurisdiction-"Maritime Locality Plus Maritime Nexus" Re-
quired to Establish Admiralty Jurisdiction in Aviation Negligence
Cases-Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 14 B.C. IND. & COM. L.
REV. 1071 (1973); Note, Elaborate Casuistry: Admiralty Jurisdiction After Executive
Jet, 34 FED. Bus. J. 157 (1975); Note, Hops, Skips and Jumps Into Admiralty Revis-
ited, 39 J. AIR L. & COMM. 625 (1973); Note, Admiralty Jurisdiction-The Airplane
Crash-A Further Exception to the Strict Locality Rule, 25 MERCER L. REV. 927
(1974); Note, Admiralty Jurisdiction: Executive Jet in Historical Perspective, 34
OHIO ST. L.J. 355 (1973).
See generally id.
9 See generally Birdwell & Whitten, Admiralty Jurisdiction: The Outlook for the
Doctrine of Executive Jet, 1974 DUKE L.J. 757, 773. The authors list four possible
rules which could be applied following Executive Jet:
(1) The old locality rule prevails as always except in specifically ex-
cepted areas, such as aircraft accidents.
(2) The old locality rule prevails as always except in the specifically
exempted areas and in cases sufficiently similar to exempted areas, e.g.
aircraft accidents arising in intracontinental flights, and not satisfacto-
rily capable of resolution by the mechanical operation of the tradi-
tional locality rule.
(3) The locality test has been flatly rejected, leaving the finding of
sufficient maritime nexus as the only relevant criterion for admiralty
jurisdiction.
19821
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
The federal district courts were soon called upon to inter-
pret and apply the Executive Jet standard. In Teachey v.
United States,9" a Coast Guard helicopter rescued plaintiff's
decedent from a sinking shrimp boat in the Gulf of Mexico. In
the course of events the helicopter crashed on land and the
rescued fisherman died of injuries resulting from the crash.9 7
Both parties cited Executive Jet as support for the assertion
of, or lack of, admiralty jurisdiction. The plaintiff relied on
the maritime nature of a search and rescue, a function tradi-
tionally performed by vessels. Although the court suggested
that the plaintiff's argument was sound, it held that the heli-
copter had completed its traditional maritime function when
it crashed.98 The court noted that, at the time of the accident,
the helicopter was merely transporting passengers between
points within the continental United States; once the helicop-
ter landed to refuel, the traditional maritime function
ceased."9 The Teachey court also discussed the portion of the
Executive Jet decision dealing with the probable causes of the
injury.100 The Florida court noted that the alleged interrup-
tion of the helicopter flight (the refueling) was caused by "cir-
(4) The test demands a finding of both locality and a maritime nexus,
the failure to find either being capable of defeating the jurisiction.
Id. at 773 (footnotes omitted).
363 F. Supp. 1197 (M.D. Fla. 1973).
" Id. at 1198. After the rescue, the helicopter landed at Key West. Id. For un-
known reasons, the plaintiff's decedent remained on the helicopter when it took off
again, and, at take-off, the helicopter crashed. Id.
" Id. at 1199.
" Id. Until the helicopter was refueled, it was a substitute for a vessel performing a
rescue operation. Once it refueled, the maritime nature of the vehicle ceased and it
proceeded on its second leg. Id. While the court looked to the function of the helicop-
ter at the time of the accident, the court referred to the traditional maritime function
language of Executive Jet as "some dicta." Id.
100 Id. The Teachey court reiterated:
Although dangers of wind and wave faced by a plane that has crashed
on navigable waters may be superficially similar to those encountered
by a sinking ship, the plane's unexpected descent will almost invaria-
bly have been attributable to a cause unrelated to the sea-be it pilot
error, defective design or manufacture of airframe or engine, error of a
traffic controller at an airport, or whatever; and the determination of
liability will thus be based on factual and conceptual inquiries unfa-
miliar to the law of admiralty.
Id. (quoting Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 270).
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cumstances having no relationship to the vagaries of sea
travel."10' Thus, the court appeared to look primarily for a
"maritime" cause as the threshold determination for admi-
ralty jurisdiction.
A Louisiana Court had an early opportunity to apply the
new Executive Jet standard of admiralty jurisdiction in Hig-
ginbotham v. Mobil Oil Corp.102 Plaintiffs were representa-
tives of the pilot and three passengers of a helicopter that
crashed into the Gulf of Mexico about 100 miles south of Lou-
isiana. The helicopter delivered employees to an offshore rig,
took off and then disappeared."' The court applied a classic
two-pronged "locality plus" analysis. The court first found
that the traditional locality test of jurisdiction was satisfied
because the accident occurred on the high seas over the outer
Continental Shelf, far outside the boundaries of Louisiana.""4
In finding the "plus," a substantial maritime relation, the
court stated:
The fated helicopter was owned and operated by Mobil in con-
junction with its extensive offshore activites, and at the time of
the fatal accident, was performing the ordinary functions of a
crewboat. Unquestionably it was engaged in a maritime activ-
ity and was not operating as a "land-based aircraft between
points within the continental United States." This holding in-
dicates that the court, rather than focusing on a maritime
"cause" as the Teachey court had done, looked instead for a
maritime "function" to satisfy its second prong.105
In Kelly v. Smith, 106 heard shortly after Higginbotham, the
1*1 Id. Query whether the outcome of this case would have been the same had the
refueling been effected at some offshore island kather then upon the mainland.
101 357 F. Supp. 1164 (W.D. La. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 436 U.S. 618 (1978).
100 Id. at 1166.
104 Id. at 1167.
I*5 d. (emphasis added) (citing Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 270). Higginbotham was
eventually appealed to the United States Supreme Court where the jurisdictional is-
sue was mentioned in a footnote. 436 U.S. at 619 n.2 (1978). The Court observed:
"The District Court bottomed admiralty jurisdiction on a finding that the helicopter
was the functional equivalent of a crewboat. The ruling has not been challenged in
this Court." 436 U.S. at 619 n.2. One could assume that the acceptance of jurisdiction
by the Supreme Court was a tacit approval of the lower court's grant of jurisdiction.
,06 485 F.2d 520 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 969 (1974).
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Fifth Circuit adopted its own jurisdictional test, which was to
be applied after consideration of all the circumstances. The
Kelly case presents a most unlikely scenario for inclusion in a
discussion of admiralty and while not involving aircraft, the
case is helpful in that the court draws on Executive Jet to
establish its jurisdictional standard. The Kelly court held that
deer poachers fleeing the gun-firing owners of a private re-
serve in a fifteen foot outboard motor boat on the Mississippi
River had a maritime cause of action for their gun-shot
wounds. 107 In announcing its test the court said:
From the facts and analysis of Executive Jet . . . we can dis-
cern factors to be considered in the circumstances before us:
the functions and roles of the parties; the types of vehicles and
instrumentalities involved; the causation and the type of in-
jury; and the traditional concepts of the role of admiralty
law.'"
107 Id.
' Id. at 525. In creating its four element test, the court reasoned:
The party most seriously injured was the pilot, the person responsible
for the safe navigation of the river. The vehicle involved was a boat,
not an automobile or airplane, whose function was transportation
across navigable waters, a traditional role of watercraft.
The other instrumentalities involved-firearms-and the injuries
they caused, are not so inherently indigenous to land as to preclude
any maritime connection. Additionally, upholding admiralty jurisdic-
tion does not stretch or distort long evolved principles of maritime
law. Admiralty has traditionally been concerned with furnishing reme-
dies for those injured while traveling navigable waters.
Policy militates toward admiralty jurisdiction in this case. The ad-
miralty jurisdiction of federal courts stems from the important na-
tional interest in uniformity of law and remedies for those facing the
hazards of waterborne transportation. Rifle fire directed at a vessel,
albeit a small one, on a major commercial artery, and injuring the pi-
lot, presents sufficient danger to maritime commerce for the federal
courts of admiralty to assume jurisdiction and to furnish remedies to
those aboard the vessel and injured by that conduct. Regardless of
whether the plaintiffs had available remedies in state courts, the fed-
eral interest in protecting navigation on the Mississippi River over-
rides any considerations of federal-state comity or conflicts of interest.
Id. at 535-36. See Motor Ship Pacific Carrier Union Camp Corp. v. Gypsum Carrier,
Inc., 489 F.2d 152, 156 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 931 (1974), in which the Fifth
Circuit, relying on Kelly, held that an action to recover for damages to a vessel
caused in a bridge collision brought against the owner of a shore-based paper mill
obstructing navigation by emitting large quantities of smoke was also within the ju-
risdiction of the admiralty.
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The Kelly test has endured in the Fifth Circuit as an aid to
determining whether torts occurring upon navigable waters
have a sufficient maritime connection to bring them within
the admiralty jurisdiction.
In 1974, the District Court of Vermont, in Miller v. Cousins
Properties, Inc.,10 9 applied Executive Jet to deny admiralty
jurisdiction to an aviation accident. Plaintiff, the administra-
tor of the deceased passenger's estate sued for wrongful death
resulting from the crash of defendant's airplane." 0 The court
looked solely to the function of the plane at the time of the
accident, characterizing it as being similar to the situation the
Supreme Court had hypothesized in Executive Jet."' The
plane had taken off from Burlington, Vermont enroute to
Providence, Rhode Island and, shortly after takeoff, crashed
over the waters of Lake Champlain." 2 The court quoted Jus-
tice Stewart in Executive Jet. "[T]here is no federal admi-
ralty jurisdiction over aviation tort claims arising from flights
by land-based aircraft between points within the continental
United States.""' 3 The court recited the Executive Jet holding
that, absent a contrary statutory provision, admiralty jurisdic-
tion resides only where there is a significant relationship to
traditional maritime activity."" Because the court ignored lo-
cality and totally relied on Justice Stewart's statement in Ex-
ecutive Jet, one can infer that the court chose to eliminate
locality as an element of admiralty jurisdiction in aviation
accidents.
A year later, in Roberts v. United States, " the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that Executive Jet created a new two-fold test for
admiralty jurisdicition. In Roberts, a cargo plane was ap-
proaching the Okinawa United States Air Base when it
crashed into navigable waters 2,000 feet short of the run-
119 378 F. Supp. 711 (D. Vt. 1974).
110 Id. at 712. Plaintiff sued the owner, manufacturer and maintenance personnel.
... Id. at 715.
11 Id. at 712.
11 Id. at 715 (quoting Executive Jet v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 274 (1972)).
114 Id.
,15 498 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1070 (1975).
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way.11 After amending the complaint to assert admiralty ju-
risdiction, the plaintiffs alleged that the accident had occured
while the aircraft was making an approach to land but was
over the high seas, and that the plane had crashed into navi-
gable waters." 7 The district court concluded that it had juris-
diction to entertain the appellee's suit as a maritime wrongful
death action under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)."'
The appellate court cited Executive Jet as having announced
a new two-fold test, retaining the navigable waters locality
prerequisite, but adding a "maritime nexus" requirement.11 9
Claiming that the Supreme Court had not closed the admi-
ralty door to all aviation accidents,2 the court said, "the Su-
preme Court . . . expressly reserved the question which is
before us now."121 The court distinguished the fact situation
before it from that of Executive Jet, stating that "since the
plane was traveling from Los Angeles to Viet Nam, 'geo-
graphic realities .. .do not make the cargo plane's contact
with navigable waters entirely 'fortuitous'; and 'more signifi-
cantly, the transoceanic transportation of cargo is an activity
which is readily analogized with traditional maritme activ-
ity.' "2 The court held that Executive Jet did not preclude a
maritime action on the facts, but held that the Statute of
"s Id. at 522. The plaintiffs brought their original complaint under the Federal
Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80 (1976). This Act makes the
United States liable under the local law of the place where the tort occurs for the
negligent or wrongful acts or omissions of federal employees within the scope of their
employment in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under
like circumstances. See PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 972 (4th ed. 1971). The United
States gained a dismissal arguing that because the tort was alleged to have occurred
in Okinawa the action was barred by section 2680(k) of the FTCA. Section 2680(k) of
the FTCA excludes "any'claim arising in a foreign country." In dismissing the suit,
the District Court granted leave to amend. 498 F.2d at 522.
'1 498 F.2d at 522. Plaintiff charged the Air Force personnel with negligence in
directing the landing and the subsequent rescue operation and filed suit in a wrongful
death action. Id.
118 Id.
1I Id. at 523.
110 Id. See supra note 90.
11 Id. at 524.
I22 d. (emphasis added). The court noted that before the advent of aviation such
shipping could only be performed by waterborne vessels. Id.
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Limitations in the Suits in Admiralty Act barred the action.'"
The Ninth Circuit was soon given another opportunity to
encounter the Executive Jet standard in T. J. Falgout Boats,
Inc. v. United States. 2" The Pacific Seal, a 299 gross ton ship
owned by Falgout Boats, Inc., while operating in navigable
waters off the California coast, was struck by a Sidewinder
missile released from a U.S. Navy airplane.' The plaintiffs
complained of negligence on the part of the pilot and sued for
damages to their vessel, claiming an aviation tort and admi-
ralty jurisdicition.' 6 The court repeated the Executive Jet ra-
tionale explained in Roberts and stated that the Supreme
Court had annexed to the "locality rule" a requirement that
the facts of the occurrence show "a significant relationship to
traditional maritime activity."1 ' Further, the court stated
that its problem was "to decide whether the circumstances
under which appellant's damages occurred bear a significant
relationship to traditional maritime activity."12  To determine
whether a significant relationship to traditional maritime ac-
tivity was present, the court applied the test announced by
the Fifth Circuit in Kelly'"2 which takes into consideration
11 Id. at 526-27. The court referred to the Suits in Admiralty Act (SIA) § 5, 46
U.S.C. §§ 741-52 (1975) and noted that an amendment to section 742 in 1960 had
been interpreted by the courts as a legislative attempt to bring all maritime torts
asserted against the United States within the purview of the SIA, the court found
that the claim could be brought under this amendment, because the limitations pe-
riod in the SIA is jurisdictional in nature. Id. The Court stated:
The two year time-bar of the Suits in Admiralty Act is unlike a time-
bar period prescribed under an ordinary Statute of Limitations. Under
an ordinary time-bar statute, a claim is not extinguished after the stat-
utory period has elapsed. It is only unenforceable. The time-bar of the,
Suits in Admiralty Act renders a claim against the United States not
only unenforceable, but extinguishes the claim itself, for when the sov-
ereign, immune from suit, consented to be sued, it was made a condi-
tion of the right to sue that suits so authorized had to be brought
within the time-bar period.
Id. at 526 (quoting States Marine Corp. of Del. v. United States, 283 F.2d 776 (2d Cir.
1960)).
124 508 F.2d 855 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1000 (1975).
508 F.2d at 856.
'" Id.
Id. at 856-57.
28 Id. at 857.
'" Kelly v. Smith, 485 F.2d 520 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 969 (1974),
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
the functions and roles of the parties, the types of vehicles
and instrumentalities involved, the causation and the type of
injury, and the traditional concepts of the role of admiralty
law.13 0
Upon application of the Kelly test, the Ninth Circuit found
that the Navy plane was maritime in nature' unlike the air-
craft in Executive Jet. The court noted that the release of the
Sidewinder from the plane over navigable waters unquestion-
ably created a potential hazard to navigation. 132 The Falgout
court reasoned that the finding of a significant relationship to
traditional maritime activity rendered this case clearly distin-
guishable from Executive Jet, and therefore Executive Jet
did not control the outcome of this case. 33
A Pennsylvania district court had the opportunity to con-
sider what could be described as one of the "perverse and cas-
uistic borderline situations"' 3' that was troublesome to the
majority in Executive Jet. In American Home Assurance Co.
v. United States""3 a plane crashed while en route from Atlan-
tic City, New Jersey, to Block Island, New York, an island
only accessible by air or sea. No part of the wreckage was
found. Plaintiffs contended that the crash was caused by the
defendant's failure to advise the pilot of poor weather condi-
tions and based their claim in admiralty.'
The court addressed plaintiff's contention that this situa-
discussed supra at notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
": 508 F.2d at 857.
"' Id. The court explained:
The United States Navy exists, in major part, for the purpose of oper-
ating vessels and aircraft in, on, and over navigable waters. Its aviation
branch is fully integrated with the naval service and, whether land-
based or sea-based, functions essentially to serve in sea operations.
Surely, it cannot be said that the naval plane's activity over water in
the instant case was entirely 'fortuitous' as was the plane involved in
Executive Jet.
Id. Query whether the outcome of this case would have been the same had the offend-
ing plane been one of the United States Army.
l3 Id.
133 Id. However, this suit was time-barred as in Roberts, because it could only be
maintained according to the Suits in Admiralty Act. See supra note 123.
:3' Executive Jet v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 255 (1972).
"a 389 F. Supp. 657 (M.D. Pa. 1975).
, Id. at 658.
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tion was similar to the example provided by the Supreme
Court in Executive Jet as a possible instance in which a
"traditional maritime activity"137 might be found.13 8 The
American Home court noted that this example followed a sen-
tence in the Executive Jet holding in which the Supreme
Court reserved judgment on the question of whether an avia-
tion tort can ever, under any circumstances, bear a sufficient
relationship to traditional maritime activity so as to be cogni-
zable in admiralty." 9 The district court chose to construe that
language narrowly and held that the fact that Block Island
was separated from the mainland was not sufficient alone to
distinguish this case from Executive Jet and support a finding
that it may be brought in admiralty.14 0
The court dismissed "locality" as an issue and considered
only the question of traditional maritime activity. Plaintiffs
asserted that weather problems, the alleged cause of the acci-
dent, were traditional factors with which navigators and
seamen were concerned. The plaintiffs asserted that the case
was one in admiralty because weather problems were the fo-
cus of their suit.'M  The court was not sympathetic to this
logic, stating that weather is a general concern rather than a
specific maritime worry. 142 . The court dismissed the action be-
cause it found that the locality was insufficient and the nexus
requirements were lacking." 3 The analysis of the American
Home court indicates that it read Executive Jet as holding
that the Supreme Court had serious doubt about whether air-
plane accidents are appropriate subjects of admiralty suits.
The District Court of the Virgin' Islands, after placing the
"silver oar of admiralty" 4 on the bench, took a different ap-
17 Id. (quoting Executive Jet v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 261 (1972))(the





14I d. at 657.
142 Id. at 658.
143 Id.
14 355 F. Supp. 683, 684. The court noted:
When the English Admiralty was finally merged into the Supreme
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proach in Hark v. Antilles Airboats, Inc. 15 Plaintiff pur-
chased a ticket for transportation on an amphibian plane from
St. Thomas to St. Croix. Seconds after takeoff, but before the
plane became completely airborne, engine failure caused the
pilot to ditch the plane in the harbor. 46 The plaintiff sued for
personal injuries claiming admiralty jurisdiction. The court
noted that, since Executive Jet, a "maritime connection" test
was to be used in addition to the locality test. The factors to
be considered were much the same as those used to determine
whether the seaplane was in its role as a "vessel" at the time
of the accident.1 47
Notwithstanding the role of the seaplane as a vessel, the
court stated three independent reasons for asserting admiralty
jurisdicition in this fact situation. First, the problems of tak-
ing off and landing a seaplane differ from those encountered
with conventional aircraft, and are instead influenced by the
"marine" nature of the runway used. 148 Secondly, when the
flight is over international waters, an admiralty forum is espe-
cially convenient.14 ' Finally, it seems desirable to treat ship
Court of Judicature in England in 1873, it became one of several divi-
sions, to wit, the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division. Each Divi-
sion of the High Court was granted the same jurisdiction so that any
judge might hear any case or transfer it to another Division. The result
of this led to confusion when the Judge switched from, say, divorce to
admiralty, and this, I am advised, led to the establishment of the cus-
tom of placing a "Silver Oar of Admiralty" on or near the bench, indi-
cating to all that drew nigh that his honor was sitting in a matter in-
volving maritime and admiralty jurisdiction. There is such an oar in





"I Id. at 686 n.2.
,,3 The court noted:
To take one example, on takeoff and landing runs, the plane is subject
to the Rules of the Road and any collision would be determined ac-
cordingly; the plane may have to turn shortly after takeoff without
proper maneuvering speed to avoid large ships anchored in a pattern
determined by the harbormaster; the take off or landing waters could
also be fraught with flotsam or ligon or just plain pollution and erratic
boaters and snorklers-all posing maritime dangers.
Id. at 686.
" Id. at 687. The court recognized the convenience of applying a nationally-uni-
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and aircraft accidents in the same manner, if possible. 150 De-
spite the court's notation of alternate grounds for establishing
admiralty jurisdiction and its policy considerations, the court
limited its jurisdictional grant to the facts in this specific
event. The court held that an amphibious airplane crash could
be grounds for a maritime tort action when the plane had not
fully completed the takeoff phase of its flight."'
More recently, a Virgin Islands district court assessed the
question of admiralty jurisdiction in Hubschman v. Antilles
Airboats, Inc.152 The plaintiff was piloting one of the defen-
dant's seaplanes. After an uneventful takeoff, the plane lost
power in both engines and was forced to land a few miles
northeast of the Puerto Rican Island of Culebra, in an area
where the Atlantic Ocean and the Caribbean Sea meet. 55 The
plane came apart and sank. 54 Three years after the acci-
dent,15 the plaintiff filed an admiralty action claiming
"unairworthiness" and "unseaworthiness,"' and seeking an
form body of admiralty law to cover all phases of this flight, which, while not interna-
tional, was for most of the flight beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the Virgin Is-
lands. The court noted that flights over international waters were more likely to
involve foreign nationals and this too supported the propriety of a federal admiralty
court. Id.
150 Id. The court noted that aircraft and marine accidents should receive similar
treatment in the courts because both aviation law and marine law involve dealing
with complex mechanisms and comparable legal terminologies. Id. at 688. The court
drew analogies between concepts of marine law which have counterparts in aviation
law: airworthiness and seaworthiness and rules of the road and last clear chance. Id.
Further, noting that aviation accidents like maritime accidents engender lengthy in-
vestigations, the court proposed that plaintiffs in aircraft accidents should have the
equitable doctrine of laches available to them. Id.
'' Id. at 685. Note that while the court cited the fact that the crash had occurred
in international waters as an alternate ground for jurisdiction, it did not limit its
holding by locality.
' 440 F. Supp. 828 (D.V.I. 1977).
I' Id. at 832.
Id. at 833.
'" The timeliness issue was considered by the court. The court stated: "As has
been flatly stated, '[tihere is no statute of limitations in admiralty." Francis, et al. v.
Pan American Trinidad Oil Co., 392 F. Supp. 1252, 1256 (D. Del. 1975)." Id. at 841.
1" See Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 95 (1946), in which the Supreme
Court announced unseaworthiness as a species of liability without fault. Mr. Chief
Justice Rutledge, delivering the majority opinion, stated that a shipowner has an ab-
solute duty to furnish a seaworthy ship which is not satisfied by the mere exercise of
due diligence. Id. He elaborated: "It is a form of absolute duty owing to all within the
range of its humitarian policy." Id. See generally 7A J. MooRE, supra note 16, at
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award for "maintenance and cure."'15 7 Because these are
causes of action and remedies afforded only by admiralty
courts, the case could be heard only if the court held that the
facts properly constituted a maritime tort. 58 .
The Hubschman court began its analysis with a discussion
of Executive Jet. The court distinguished the facts before it
from the facts which gave rise to the Executive Jet decision,
and noted that the Executive Jet decision had not expressly
ruled aviation accident suits out of admiralty courts. " The
court noted, "The [Supreme Court], nonetheless dropped lan-
guage by the wayside from which the expansive, as well as the
restrictive readers of its opinion (the respective sides in the
instant dispute) could take comfort."'6 0 The court then re-
cited the cases relating to aviation accidents and maritime ju-
risdiction that have followed the Executive Jet decision, and
noted the lack of uniformity in the standards.""
The court's analysis proceeded in a classic "locality plus"
.325[41. In order to maintain this cause of action, the plaintiff would have had to have
this seaplane judicially characterized as a "vessel."
81 440 F. Supp. 828, 833 (D.V.I. 1977). Only seamen are entitled to benefit from
the provisions of the doctrine of "maintenance and cure." See 7A J. MOORE, supra
note 16, at .325[4]. This is an ancient admiralty remedy, as fully articulated in
O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36 (1943). See supra note 51.
In order to qualify for this award, the plaintiff would have to be himself judicially
characterized as a seaman which is a fact question. See generally Mach v. Pennsylva-
nia R.R. Co., 317 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1963) (holding that whether plaintiff is or is not a
seaman is a question for the trier of fact, to be determined from the particular cir-
cumstances of each case).
1" 440 F. Supp. at 834. Plaintiff based his cause of action on the Jones Act, 46
U.S.C. § 688 (1970). See infra note 184 and accompanying text. Soon after the acci-
dent, a claim for Workmen's Compensation under the laws of the Virgin Islands was
filed, adjudicated and paid. 440 F. Supp. at 834.
440 F. Supp. at 835.
I" ld. The defendants cited the language of Executive Jet referring to "[t]he mere
fact that the alleged wrong occurs or is located on or over navigable waters... is not
of itself sufficient to turn an airplane negligence case into a 'maritime tort.'" Execu-
tive Jet v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 268 (1972). Plaintiffs rely on the phrases:
It could be argued, for instance, that if a plane flying from New York
to London crashed in the mid-Atlantic, there would be admiralty juris-
diction over resulting tort claims even absent a specific statute. An air-
craft in that situation might be thought to bear a significant relation-
ship to traditional maritime activity because it would be performing a
function traditionally performed by waterborne vessels.
Id. at 271.
"1 440 F.Supp. at 839.
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fashion." 2 Considering first the locality of the accident, the
court concluded that it was certainly maritime. The court
then determined that the alleged wrong had "a significant re-
lationship to traditional maritime activity,"'' 3 basing this
finding on the earlier Hark v. Antilles Airboats, Inc. e4 case.
The court noted that the problems of taking off and landing a
seaplane differ from those encountered with conventional air-
craft. 65 Further, the court stated that "where the flight is
over international waters, as it was here, there are especial
conveniences in using the admiralty forum."' 6 The court said
that it was not confronted with a fortuitous open sea air
crash. The plane in this case did not fall into the sea, as did
its counterpart in Executive Jet; the seaplane was doing pre-
cisely what it was designed to do, landing on the water.167
The court stated "One has to seek far and wide to find cir-
cumstances that more forcefully point to the existence of
'maritime nexus.' ,,6e Holding that the plane was afloat upon
navigable waters at the time of the occurrence, and was thus
subject to the admiralty,6 9 the court concluded that the ful-
fillment of a maritime function had been properly
demonstrated.7 0
A consistent standard has not been applied by the federal
10, See Chapman v. City of Grosse Pointe Farms, 385 F.2d 962 (6th Cir. 1967),
discussed supra at note 39 and accompanying text.
16S 440 F. Supp. at 840.
16, 355 F. Supp. at 683 (D.VI. 1973), discussed supra at notes 145-51 and accom-
panying text.
,65 440 F. Supp. 840. Such problems are influenced by the aquatic nature of the
runway used. Id.
160 Id. The court in Hark v. Antilles Airboats, 355 F. Supp. 683 (D.V.I. 1973) noted
that flights over international high seas were beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the
point of departure. "It would therefore seem most convenient to refer to the nation-
ally uniform admiralty laws to cover all phases of such a flight." Id. at 687. See supra
note 149.
167 440 F. Supp. at 840.
100 Id.
6 Id. at 841. (quoting Reinhardt v. Newport Flying Serv. Corp., 232 N.Y. 115, 133
N.E. 371 (1921). See supra note 59.
170 Id. It is noteworthy, however, that while the court admitted the suit to admi-
ralty, the court held that the seaplane was not a vessel nor was the pilot a seaman for
purposes of "unseaworthiness" claims or the appeal for maintenance and cure. "It
bears mention that sustained research has not uncovered a single case holding an
aircraft to be a 'vessel' and the pilot of an aircraft to be a 'seaman.'" Id. at 848.
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courts to aviation litigants seeking admiralty jurisdiction. The
clarity that could have resulted from the Executive Jet deci-
sion has not materialized and now, instead of one criteria, "lo-
cality," there are a number of rationales with no clear focus.
In Teachey v. United States,"' the court inferred that the
function at the time of the accident determined admiralty ju-
risdiction, but would not grant admiralty jurisdiction unless
the cause of the accident was maritime. Looking also at func-
tion, the District Court in Miller v. Cousins Properties, Inc.1
7 2
dismissed a suit involving a crash into a lake of a land-based
passenger plane. In Higginbotham v. Mobil Oil Corp.,7 3 the
Fifth Circuit summarily held that the helicopter was a func-
tional equivalent of a crewboat and granted jurisdiction.
The Ninth Circuit applied a "locality plus" test in granting
jurisdiction to a transoceanic cargo plane's crash in Roberts v.
United States,14 but then adopted the Kelly 5 criteria of the
Fifth Circuit shortly thereafter when considering T.J. Falgout
Boats, Inc. v. United States.7 6 A Pennsylvania district court
decided that an aircraft crash resulting from weather
problems is not a significant connection to traditional mari-
time activity in American Home Assurance Co. v. United
States.17 7 The District Court of the Virgin Islands has, on two
occasions, granted admiralty jurisdiction to seaplane acci-
dents. In Hark v. Antilles Airboats, Inc. 75 and Hubschman v.
Antilles Airboats, Inc.7 9 the court focused on the traditional
"1 363 F. Supp. 1197 (M.D. Fla. 1973). See supra notes 95-102 and accompanying
text.
"1 378 F. Supp. 711 (D.C. Vt. 1974).
,,3 357 F. Supp. 1164 (W.D. La. 1973), af/'d in part, 545 F.2d 422 (5th Cir. 1977),
rev'd on other gournd, 430 U.S. 618 (1978), discussed supra at notes 102-08 and ac-
companying text.
174 498 F.2d 520 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1070 (1974), discussed supra at
notes 115-23 and accompanying text.
'78 Kelly v. Smith, 485 F.2d 520 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 969 (1974),
discussed supra at notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
" 508 F.2d 855 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1000 (1975), discussed supra
at notes 124-33 and accompanying text.
177 389 F. Supp. 657 (M.D. Pa. 1975), discussed supra at notes 135-45 and accom-
panying text.
,18 355 F. Supp. 683 (D.V.I. 1973), discussed supra at notes 145-51 and accompa-
nying text.
179 440 F. Supp. 828 (D.V.I. 1977), discussed supra at notes 152-70 and accompa-
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marine-like problems encountered by seaplanes in their take-
offs and landings, and buttressed their grant of jurisdiction to
policy considerations concerning the attractiveness of admi-
ralty forums when dealing with flights over international
waters.
THE JONES ACT Is EXTENDED To AVIATION
Because the courts and legislatures have developed admi-
ralty to provide a set of rules and principles applicable to the
particular problems of maritime commerce and the attendant
navigation considerations, they should also develop a body of
law uniquely suited to aviation.180 Aviation is not maritime
and the industry does not necessarily serve the same functions
or involve the same instrumentalities as maritime commerce.
Further, the standard articulated in Executive Jet has not re-
ceived uniform treatment by the courts nor has it been uni-
formly understood. 8' A recent example of the continuing lack
of uniformity and consequent results thereof is well illustrated
in the case of Barger v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc.1 82 in
which Jones Act remedies were provided to a helicopter pilot
following his judicial characterization as a "seaman." The sce-
nario is quite similar to that of Higginbotham'83 in that it in-
volves a helicopter transporting workers to offshore oil rigs.
Although Higginbotham granted admiralty jurisdiction on the
theory that the helicopter was the functional equivalent of a
crewboat,' 4 the plaintiff in Barger sought access on different
grounds. In Barger, the plaintiff wanted the substantive admi-
ralty law under the Jones Act"8' to apply in order to judicially
nying text.
18o See generally Note, Hops, Skips and Jumps Into Admiralty Revisited, 39 J.
AIR L. & CoMM. 625 (1973).
,81 See supra notes 170-78 and accompanying text.
182 514 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Tex. 1981).
183 357 F. Supp. 1164 (W.D. La. 1973). See supra notes 102-09 and accompanying
text.
'" Id. at 1167.
I8 Act of June 5, 1920 (Jones Act), ch. 250, § 33, 41 Stat. 1007 (1920) (currently
codified at 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976)). The Jones Act provides, in pertinent part, that:
Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his em-
ployment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law,
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characterize the helicopter as a "vessel" and himself as a "sea-
man."18 This treatment would have allowed him access to the
more attractive remedies and burdens of proof available under
the Jones Act.187 In analyzing the facts, the court defined
"seaman" and "vessel" as including the pilot and helicopter
and cited the Higginbotham a8s decision in both determi-
nations.
The Fifth Circuit has formulated a three-part test for deter-
mining whether a given employee is a "seaman" for the pur-
poses of the Jones Act:'8 '
with the right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the
United States modifying or extending the common-law right or rem-
edy in cases of personal injury to railway employees shall apply; and in
case of death of any seaman as a result of any such personal injury the
personal representative of such seaman may maintain an action for
damages at law with the right of trial by jury, and in such action all
statutes of the United States conferring or regulating the right of ac-
tion for death in the case of railway employees shall be applicable.
Id.
The act made applicable to seamen injured in the course of their employment the
provisions of the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA), 34 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1976),
which gives to railroad employees a right of recovery for injuries resulting from the
negligence of their employer, its agents or employees. The term "seaman" is con-
tained in the original Jones Act. In 1927 Congress enacted the Longshoremen and
Harborworkers Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901 (1976) which applied to all mari-
time workers except masters or "members of a crew of a vessel." The Supreme Court
held in Swanson v. Marra Bros., Inc., 328 U.S. 1 (1946) that the effect of the Act was
to restrict the benefits of the Jones Act to "members of a crew of a vessel." Id. The
terms "seaman" and "member of a crew" are not used interchangeably.
'" 514 F. Supp. at 1205. A similar request was denied the plaintiff in Hubschman
v. Antilles Airboats, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 828 (D.V.I. 1977), discussed supra at notes
152-69 and accompanying text. See generally 7A J. MOORE supra note 16 at 1 .324[4].
"87 Included in these attractive doctrines are the concepts of unseaworthiness,
maintenance and cure, and the Jones Act benefits. Unseaworthiness is a species of
liability without fault. Maintenance and cure is a concept which entitles an injured
seaman to full care and pay after he suffers an injury. The Jones Act supplies a tort
cause of action to a seaman allowing him to seek compensation from his employer for
personal injuries arising from maritime employment regardless of where the injury
occurs. See supra notes 156-57, 185 and accompanying text.
"8 514 F. Supp. at 1205-07. The court hinted at its willingness to expand jurisdic-
tion when it said: "assuming for the moment that the helicopter in question was a
vessel. . . ." Id. at 1206.
3' See Swanson v. Marra Bros., Inc., 328 U.S. 1 (1946); Guidry v. South La. Con-
tractors, Inc., 614 F.2d 447 (5th Cir. 1980); Wixom v. Boland Marine & Mfg. Co., Inc.,
614 F.2d 956 (5th Cir. 1980); Wilkerson v. Movible Offshore, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1279
(E.D. Tex. 1980).
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1) he must have a more or less permanent connection with
2) a vessel in navigation and
3) the capacity in which he is employed or the duties which
he performs must contribute to the function of the vessel, the
accomplishment of its mission or its operation or welfare in
terms of its maintenance during its movement or during
anchorage for its future trips. '
The Barger court decided that because Barger had worked for
the defendant for six years, he was "permanent." The court
then moved from the first prong of the test directly to the
third prong. Citing Higginbotham v. Mobil Oil'9' the court
said that Barger was "no doubt" a contributor to the function
of the "vessel" in the most essential way. "He was its pilot,
navigator, and sole crewmember."' 92 The Higginbotham find-
ing that a helicopter was the functional equivalent of a
crewboat was used to support the finding that the pilot of the
helicopter, or crewboat, was a "seaman."' 93
The Higginbotham finding that the transportation of per-
sonnel to and from oil drilling platforms is a traditional mari-
time activity also was used as support for the Barger court's
determination that a helicopter is a "vessel".' 94 As part of its
514 F. Supp. at 1205-06.
Id. at 1206 (citing Higginbotham v. Mobil Oil Corp., 545 F.2d 422, 433 n.13 (5th
Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 436 U.S. 618 (1978)).
'" 514 F. Supp. at 1206.
,93 Id.
1" Id. In determining that the helicopter was a "vessel" the court used a "grab
bag" analysis. First, it quoted cases stating the proposition that the Jones Act is re-
medial legislation and is to be broadly construed. Id. at 1206. Second, the court de-
scribed the marine-like features of the helicopter: it was equipped with pontoons, a
life raft and other life-saving apparatus; it had permanently affixed pontoons to en-
able it to land, take off, float and taxi on water. Id. Third, the court considered his-
torical definitions of "vessel."
The Merchant Marine Act of 1920, ch. 250, §§ 1-39, 41 Stat. 988-1008,
which subsumes the Jones Act, incorporates the definition of "vessel"
contained in the Shipping Act of 1916, 39 Stat. 728-38 (codified as
amended at 46 U.S.C. § 801 (1976)). The Shipping Act provides: "The
term 'vessel' includes all water craft and other artificial contrivances of
whatever description and at whatever stage of construction, whether
on the stocks or launched, which are used or are capable of being or
are intended to be used as a means of transportation on water."
Id. at 1206-07.
Fourth, the court quoted the Fifth Circuit opinion in Offshore Co. v. Robinson, 266
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analysis, the court stated that recent Fifth Circuit cases had,
in defining "vessel," considered the purpose for which the
craft was constructed and the business in which it was en-
gaged. "Barger's helicopter was constructed for the purpose of
transporting men and material across the navigable waters of
the Gulf of Mexico. The craft was specifically designed for
landings, takeoffs, and movement on water. Thus, the first
prong of the analysis has been met. '9 5
The court said that the defendant was the world's largest
commercial helicopter firm and was engaged almost exclu-
sively in the business of transporting personnel to and from
oil drilling platforms located in the territorial and navigable
waters of the United States and other countries."' Quoting
the Higginbotham decision, the court said, "There is no doubt
that this is a traditional maritime activity and that Barger's
helicopter was the functional equivalent of a crewboat".1 97
This degree of involvement in a maritime endeavor was held
sufficient to satisfy the second prong of the court's analysis.
Thus, the Barger court took a step that no court had previ-
F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1959), which adopted the definition of "vessel" from the Merchant
Marine Act. The court said this statutory definition -encompassed "special purpose
structures not usually employed as means of transport by water but designed to float
on water." 266 F.2d at 779.
The Barger court decided that a helicopter equipped with permanently affixed pon-
toons was certainly an artificial contrivance capable of being used to transport and to
float on water. 514 F. Supp. at 1207.
As a fifth point of analysis, the court quoted again from Robinson:
Attempts to fix unvarying meaning have [sic] a firm legal significance
to such terms as "seaman", "vessel", "member of a crew" must come
to grief on the facts. These terms have such a wide range of meaning
under the Jones Act as interpreted in the courts, that, except in rare
cases, only a jury or trier of fact can determine their application in the
circumstances of a particular case.
Id. at 1207 (quoting Offshore Co. v. Robinson, 266 F.2d at 779-80).
Finally, the court noted that floatation on water alone did not qualify a structure as
a "vessel" under the Jones Act. See supra note 184. The additional element of risk
and exposure to the hazards of the sea must also be present. Id. Noting that the
helicopter pilots involved in offshore oil transport were clearly subject to these risks,
the court found that the helicopter was a "vessel" under the Jones Act and that
Barger was a "seaman." Id. at 1208.




ously been willing to take and extended the liberal Jones Act
remedies to litigants in aviation suits by bootstrapping a "lo-
cality plus" analysis onto a cause of action based on the Jones
Act." '9 Numerous commentators believe that such a liberal ap-
plication of Jones Act definitions to grant admiralty jurisdic-
tion is as unwarranted and indefensible as the strict locality
test that preceded it.199
DO AVIATION ACCIDENTS BELONG IN ADMIRALTY
COURTS
Not all courts have been so hasty to grant jurisdiction based
on mere technical compliance with the common law elements.
The Fourth Circuit, in Crosson v. Vance200 placed great
weight on the historical aspects of admiralty in its decision to
deny admiralty jurisdiction. Although the facts involved an
injury to a swimmer and a vessel the court looked beyond
these independent elements, stating that
[tihe admiralty jurisdiction in England and in this country was
born of a felt need to protect the domestic shipping industry in
its competition with foreign shipping, and to provide a uniform
body of law for the governance of domestic and foreign ship-
ping, engaged in the movement of commercial vessels from
state to state and to and from foreign states.20'
Historically based reasoning was also applied by an Iowa
district court in Clinton Board of Park Commissioners v.
Claussen.202 In Claussen, even though the court made a find-
ing of "locality" and "vessel", admiralty jurisdiction was de-
IU See supra note 170.
See generally 7A J. MOORE, supra note 16, at .325[3]; Birdwell & Whitten,
Admiralty Jurisdiction: The Outlook for the Doctrine of Executive Jet, 1974 DUKE
L.J. 757; Note, Admiralty Jurisdiction: Executive Jet in Historical Perspective, 34
OHIO ST. L.J. 355 (1973).
200 484 F.2d 840 (4th Cir. 1973).
01' Id. at 840.
202 410 F. Supp. 320 (S.D. Iowa 1976) (a boy drowned after jumping from a floating
platform, allegedly negligently secured by employees of a vessel; the platform became
unsecured and floated off into the river and the boy, in confusion and fright, jumped
off and drowned).
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nied.2 0 ' The court stated:
The Court cannot conceive how the incident at bar satisfies the
stated jurisdictional test when the historical underpinnings of
admiralty law are considered. Neither party here can be said to
have been involved in maritime navigation or commerce in the
true admiralty sense, nor in the Court's opinion does any as-
pect of this matter relate in a significant way to the original
concepts of federal admiralty law. The Court has difficulty ac-
cepting the notion that principles developed to govern the do-
mestic shipping industry and to provide a uniform body of sea-
related jurisprudence should be applied to what is essentially a
wrongful death action clearly capable of efficient adjudication
by state tort law. 04
Other considerations also suggest that aviation accidents do
not belong in admiralty jurisdiction. The plaintiff in admiralty
court has available the traditional maritime remedies of at-
tachment and garnishment and process in rem and liberal
venue provisions.20 In addition, he has available the very lib-
eral substantive maritime law, including the concept of com-
parative negligence. 20 " The plaintiff also need not concern
himself with the statutes of limitation under admiralty juris-
diction.20 7 The defendant in admiralty court may claim the
benefits of the maritime concept of limitation of liability
which allows him protection from a damage judgment in ex-
cess of the value of his wrecked vessel.20 8 These concepts and
remedies are uniquely suited to maritime industry.
A party could possibly challenge an assertion of admiralty
jurisdiction on constitutional grounds. The constitutional
203 Id. at 326.
I" Id. at 325.
'0 See 7A J. MOORE, supra note 16, at V .325[5].
206 Id.
$07 Id.
I08 Id. The Limitation of Liability Act of 1951, ch. 43, 9 Stat. 635 (codified as
amended at 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 181-89 (1958)), provides that the shipowner may on the
occurrence of some event for which the ship is liable-to cargo, to passengers, to em-
ployees or harbor workers or to some other ship-restrict his liability to whatever
value the ship may have after the event-e.g. a few strippings from a wreck. See G.
GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY, ch. 10 (1975).
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grant 09 could be interpreted to extend admiralty jurisdiction
solely to cases of admiralty and maritime nature. Therefore,
one could argue that the grant of admiralty jurisdiction to a
high sea helicopter accident case is unconstitutional if one
were to ascribe historic understanding to the language of the
grant. As the Supreme Court said in Executive Jet,210 "The
mere fact that the alleged wrong 'occurs' or 'is located' on or
over navigable waters . . . is not of itself sufficient to turn an
airplane negligence case into a maritime tort."2" '
What precisely is sufficient to turn an airplane negligence
case into a maritime tort was not made clear in the 1972 Su-
preme Court decision Executive Jet. The approaches to dis-
cerning the proper interpretation of the "significant nexus" in
the reported fact situations lend evidence to this lack of clear
understanding.
The Barger plaintiff's admission to admiralty is a logical ex-
tension of jurisdictional development if one merely looks at
the various phrases upon which the courts have focused since
Executive Jet. The helicopter could be characterized as a sub-
stitute for a vessel. The defendant, Petroleum Helicopter, fits
the description given to Mobil Oil in the Higginbotham case
and thereby qualifies as a maritime defendant. The Barger
plaintiff was the "pilot" of his "vessel" at the time of the acci-
dent. and the "vessel" was performing the duties of a
crewboat. Because the offshore oil industry is necessarily in
the water, we cannot argue that geographic realities made the
helicopter's contact with the water entirely fortuitous. There
is a maritime nature to the runway that a helicopter equipped
with pontoons must use for its take-offs and landings. Yet,
while technically jurisdiction is proper, one may question the
logic and policy served by this decision.
Since admiralty law has developed to serve the unique
needs of ocean-going vessels and ocean-going seamen, the sub-
stantive law of admiralty is tailored to the needs of these par-
ties. Unseaworthiness, maintenance and cure, the Jones Act
:09 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
110 Executive Jet v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
Id. at 268.
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benefits and other admiralty doctrines were fashioned as a re-
sponse to their perceived needs in the maritime industry. The
aviation industry has also presented unique legal problems,
but admiralty substantive law does not appear to be the most
potent or appropriate solution. Until Congress provides the
courts with a statute governing aviation as an industry, 12 the
author suggests that the courts hearing suits arising from avi-
ation torts deny admiralty jurisdiction to the litigants unless
jurisdiction is expressly provided by the language of an ex-
isting statute. The argument for denying such litigants the
benefits of admiralty substantive law is based on policies of
protecting the justified expectations of the parties, protecting
the justified expectation of the state with the dominant inter-
est, and maintaining uniformity of the laws applicable to
these two differing industries. Jurisdiction to admiralty courts
is appropriately granted only when it is manifestly clear that
the individual elements that make up the cause of action are
substantially related to the traditional notions of maritime in-
dustry and commerce. When this is so, admiralty law is com-
pelled by logic. When this is not so, the grant of jurisdiction
"' See S. 1876, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (May 23, 1973) which would replace 28 U.S.C §
1333 (1966) and which in § 1316, provides in part as follows:
(a) The district courts all have original jurisdiction without regard to
amount in controversy of all civil actions of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction, including those of interpleader, declaratory or equitable
relief, and including but not limited to the following:
(1) any claim, whether founded in contract, or tort, arising out of the
construction, mortgage, sale, ownership, possession, operation, naviga-
tion, chartering, servicing, or scrapping of any vessel of three hundred
gross tons or more used or intended to be used on navigable waters,
notwithstanding that the damage or injury involved be done or con-
summated on land;
(2) ancillary and pendent jurisdiction .. .over nonmaritime, State,
Federal, or foreign law claims, in any action where personal jurisdic-
tion has been obtained in the plaintiff's original action; and
(3) any claim arising out of an aircraft accident, occurring on or over
the high seas or other navigable waters beyond a marine league from
the shore of any state or the territories but such jurisdiction shall not
include:
(4) any claim solely because it arose on or over navigable waters of the
United States.
Id. (emphasis added).
This bill was referred to the Judiciary Committee and has not been reported out.
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merely adds to the confusion and cost involved in transacting
business and litigating claims arising from business
relationships.
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